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Incentives of Retirement Transition for Elderly Workers:  
An Analysis of Actual and Simulated Replacement Rates  
in Ireland 
 
Retirement behaviours and elderly poverty issues have been the subject of much attention 
and discussion in recent years as most countries are facing a rapidly ageing society. Ireland 
enjoys a relatively young population compared with other European countries, but is also 
struggling with increasing fiscal pressures. This paper analyses the retirement pattern and 
the replacement rate observed in Ireland using the Living in Ireland panel dataset. Since 
traditional empirical estimations may have selection bias issues as people with low 
replacement rates may not choose to retire, the paper adopts a combined method with both 
synthetic household simulation and empirical estimates. The study reveals the social 
economic attributes patterns associated with the replacement rates and retirement 
behaviours, and explores the heterogeneities of replacement rates among retirees. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Retirement behaviours and elderly poverty issues have been the subject of much attention and 
discussion in recent years as most countries are facing a rapidly ageing society. Ireland enjoys a 
relatively young population compared with other European countries, but is also struggling with 
increasing fiscal pressures. Although Ireland has reformed its pension system over the past few years 
(Whelan, 2007), little work has been undertaken to understand what contributes to the pattern of 
retirement in Ireland, and what monetary incentives are introduced by the existing regulations.  
There are many reasons for people to retire: retirement regulations, financial incentives, health status 
etc., may all contribute. From the supply side of the labour market, an individual may choose to retire 
if the expected post-retirement income is sufficiently high. Meanwhile, from the demand side, 
employers may use incentives to keep productive employees working as long as possible in order to 
save the total pay-out of occupational pension. While many factors are weighted when an individual 
makes the transition to retirement, it is impossible to analyse all the factors at once. Therefore, this 
paper focuses only on the monetary incentive, which is one of the most quantifiable and used 
variables. 
From a social policy point of view, the absolute amount of postretirement income is important since it 
determines the minimum living standard that a retiree is able to secure during their retirement, whilst 
the absolute benefit level determines the public expenditure necessary to finance the pension system. 
While economists may be more interested in the smoothing of marginal utility rather than the income 
per se, the data required for the calculations does not exist. Instead, most researchers have taken an 
indirect approach by comparing income before and after retirement by using the replacement rate. 
This is defined as the ratio of a person's consumption or income after retirement to before retirement, 
and has become a popular measurement for analysing post-retirement welfare. 
In order to analyse the potential replacement rates for elderly workers under differing scenarios, it is 
necessary to build the analysis around a dataset with rich social economic variables and a tax-benefit 
microsimulation tool. A sub-component of the LIAM model was used to facilitate the analysis based 
on a long dataset derived from the LII dataset. The framework built around this dataset allows the 
labour market trajectory of each potential retiree to be investigated. Previous literature on the effect of 
the Irish state pension regulations on retirement behaviour is relatively rare. Some studies have looked 
at the work incentives in the Irish labour market through replacement rates (Callan et al., 2006; 
Immervoll and O’Donoghue, 2003a), while others have attempted to estimate the implicit tax rate for 
elderly workers (Blöndal and Scarpetta, 1997), and more recent studies (e.g. Hughes and Watson, 
2005) have examined how the income of pensioners in 2000 has varied across social groups based on 
reported retirements. However, little attention has been paid to the individual’s choice of actual 
retirement in Ireland. Existing research on retirement typically uses the reported retirement status, 
which suggests that almost everyone retires within one year of becoming eligible for the state pension 
(Raab and Gannon, 2009). By including working individuals, bias may be introduced with regard to 
the real incentives behind retirement behaviour, meaning that the potential behaviour change resulting 
from regulation change cannot be inferred.  
Ireland, in some aspects of its retirement regulations, is different from many other countries. The state 
pension is not linked to employment status, which means an individual can claim his/her pension 
whilst still working full time. This type of regulation effectively creates two retirement time points: classified as retired and receiving state pension, and actually exiting the labour market. While the first 
time point of retirement is mostly the result of an individual’s age and job sector, the second time 
point is more interesting from the policy point of view as it is an active individual choice instead of a 
passive transition. One of the primary concerns of the pension policy is that retirees should have an 
income sufficient to secure a reasonable standard of living. Analysing the retirement income based 
solely on the official status may introduce a bias towards the living standard of the retirees as this is a 
mixed group containing also individuals employed in full time jobs. 
This paper examines the monetary incentives behind the tax benefit system for elderly workers in 
Ireland using an estimated replacement rate and compares the monetary incentives with the pattern of 
retirement. A combined method of synthetic household simulation and empirical estimations from the 
panel dataset LII is used. By performing simulations with the synthetic household data, the existing 
incentives embedded in the state pension regulation can be understood, and by relating the 
replacement rate information to an empirical micro dataset, it is possible to analyse the factors behind 
different observed replacement rate levels and retirement ages (e.g. benefit levels, household 
composition etc). With this combined approach, it is possible to analyse the monetary driving forces 
behind retirement and to investigate how it compares with the retirement patterns observed in Ireland. 
The institutional features of the state pension system in Ireland are outlined briefly in section 2 and 
the methodology and measurements of the replacement rates are discussed in section 3. Section 4 
describes some of the details of the simulation model used in the tax-benefit calculation and is 
followed by a description of the data in section 5. The results of the analysis are presented in sections 
6, 7 and 8. Section 6 reports the result of the replacement rate analysis via a set of synthetic 
households and section 7 takes a closer look at the distribution of replacement rates estimated from 
the panel dataset from different aspects. Finally, section 8 compares the distribution of retirement with 
replacement rates.  
II.  DESCRIPTION OF THE IRISH TAX-BENEFIT SYSTEMS FOR ELDERLY 
The Irish tax-benefit system is in many respects similar to the Anglo welfare state, with relatively 
insignificant social insurance systems in place. In this type of system, means testing and progressive 
income taxes are more important than in equivalent continental social security systems (Esping-
Andersen, 1996). Many welfare benefits in Ireland are flat rate based and are not earnings related 
(Evans et al., 2000; Callan, 1997). Ireland has a set of categorical instruments, covering contingencies 
such as unemployment, old age disability, lone parenthood etc., with different means tests and 
eligibility conditions, but similar levels of benefit (O’Donoghue, 2001). 
The Irish pension system is frequently presented as a multi-pillar system with a relatively small 
mandatory first pillar consisting of a flat (i.e. no earnings related) social insurance system, and means-
tested social assistance. The occupational and private pension systems (the second and third pillars) 
play a major role in the replacement of earnings. Public pensions are in general pay as you go 
(PAYG), with the private sector providing funded occupational or private pensions to about half of 
the workers in 2005. Table 1 provides an overview of the components of the relevant welfare benefits 
for the elderly in Ireland
1. 
                                                            
1  This section aims to give a brief description of the current Irish pension system. For a more detailed 
description of the tax benefit system in Ireland and its pension system, please refer to O’Donoghue (2001; 2003) 
and Baroni & O’Donoghue (2009) Table 1 Irish Pension System 
1
st Pillar  Old Age Non-Contributory Pension 
Old Age Contributory Pension 
Invalidity Pension 
Widow, Widower ,Orphan and other Pensions Benefits 
2
nd Pillar  Public service pay-as-you-go schemes 
Funded occupational pension schemes set up by employers 
3
rd Pillar  Supplementary private pensions arranged by individuals 
First Pillar: State Pension System 
The state pension applies automatically to everyone who lives and works in Ireland and consists of 
several different provisions which together constitute the social welfare pension. It includes the basic 
old age non-contributory pension, an old age contributory pension, and smaller pension items such as 
invalidity, widow’s pension etc. The non-contributory pension is independent of employment 
trajectory and covers residents aged over 66 with an income below the threshold level set via a means-
test. Only those people whose income satisfies the test are entitled to the full means-tested benefit. If 
an individual’s income is above certain income threshold then the benefit is withdrawn completely. 
The amount of pension received by an individual is determined by age and household composition 
(e.g. whether the individual is living alone etc.)  
The old age contributory pension, as suggested by its name, requires an established contribution 
record from an individual before it can be drawn. The amount of contribution that a worker pays 
depends on the earnings and the type of work. In Ireland, contributions are referred to as PRSI (Pay 
Related Social Insurance). The nature and the wage of the job determine the type of class and rate of 
contribution paid by an employee. According to the Irish regulations, the recipient of a contributory 
pension must have paid or credited at least 260 social insurance full-rate contributions during their 
working years (counted from either 1953 or the date when they started insurable employment, to 
when they reach the age of 56). This qualifies an individual to be eligible for a flat rate non-earnings 
related weekly benefit once they retire from the labour market at the age of 65 or when they reach 66, 
regardless of their current employment status. The PRSI contribution conditions may be based on 
either of the spouses’ records but cannot be combined. 
Second Pillar: Occupational and Private Pension Membership 
Ireland places an important emphasis on supplementary funded occupational and private pensions 
(second and third pillars) as do other countries with multi-pillar systems. The system is however still 
relatively immature since it only covers around half of the working population and elder workers are 
likely to be excluded due to the inexistence of private pension plans during their early ages.  
Depending on the nature of their job, type of employment etc., individuals may be eligible for 
additional pension plans. This may include an occupational pension or a private pension. Table 2 
gives an overview of the occupational and private pension coverage in Ireland in 2001. Occupational 
pensions in Ireland are usually organized by employers and the plans can be divided between those 
guaranteed by the state, covering all public sector employees, and those provided by firms. The latter 
category is much newer and has a relatively lower coverage. Since 2003, employers who do not offer 
an occupational plan are now obliged to provide access to a private retirement saving account. 
According to the pension question survey in the QNHS Q1-2002, conducted by Ireland’s Central 
Statistics Office (CSO), nearly 20% of the working population contributed to a private pension fund and around 40% of workers had occupational pension coverage. Approximately 47% of all workers 
do not have additional pension rights besides the state coverage. Appendix A provides a more detailed 
overview of pension coverage by gender. 
Table 2 Occupational and private pension coverage among Irish workers 
Overall pension status for workers  Freq.  Percentage 
Self-employed with a private pension  1,967  8.3 
Employee with an occupational pension only  8,645  36.3 
Employee with a private pension only  1,083  4.6 
Employees with both occupational and private pension 709  3.0 
Employees with no pension  8,823  37.0 
Self-employed with no pension  2,574  10.8 
    (Source: QNHS Q1-2002, and author’s calculation) 
Retirement Age 
The working population in Ireland, as in most other parts of the world, does not have a single fixed 
retirement age. The earliest retirement age with full rights varies according to occupation and job 
sector. 
As stated earlier, the state old age pension is either means tested or contribution based. There is no 
penalty for retirees who retire early, although they cannot claim the benefit until aged 65/66. For 
occupational pensions, the retirement age is usually set out in the contract of employment. Some 
contracts of employment have a mandatory retirement age and also contain provisions for earlier 
retirement, generally and/or on the grounds of ill health. Public sector workers who started working 
before 1 April 2004 have to retire at age 65, with the exception of a limited number of occupations, 
e.g. the defence forces, who have provisions for earlier retirement. For people who joined the public 
sector after 1 April 2004, the earliest retirement age is 65 except a few occupations such as police and 
fire fighters. 
Since receiving certain old age benefits (e.g., old age contributory pension) does not necessarily mean 
that an individual is out of the labour market, a more strict definition of retirement was used in this 
study. Here, it is defined as an individual who has stopped working or receiving unemployment 
benefit after the age of 55 and who does not re-enter the labour market.  
III.  METHODOLOGY I: REPLACEMENT RATE MEASURES 
Replacement Rate 
Replacement rates are often used to assess how well elderly people can maintain their pre-retirement 
level of consumption once they stop working (Munnell and Soto, 2005). The idea behind the 
replacement rate concept is that a person’s welfare being or living standard in retirement can be 
measured as a proportion of their living standard during their working life. It is usually defined as the 
ratio of a person's consumption or income after retirement compared to before retirement.  
There are a number of different approaches when conducting replacement rate analyses. Some 
research (e.g. Central Planning Bureau, 1995) uses one or a few artificially created synthetic 
households to illustrate the effect of the tax benefit system on the replacement rate, while other studies 
(e.g. Engen et al., 1999; Scholz et al., 2004; Immervoll and O’Donoghue, 2003b) have used simulation techniques to calculate the counterfactual income to estimate the replacement rate. 
Depending on what type of data is used, the methods can be grouped into three categories: synthetic 
analysis, empirical data based analysis, and simulated data based analysis. A discussion of the usage 
of each method can be found in Immervoll and O’Donoghue (2002).  
Synthetic or stylised household analysis is widely used within the tax-benefit literature. This uses one 
or a set of “average households” to estimate the benefit level. The most common type of calculations 
assume a set of average characteristics (e.g., in-work income of an average production worker) which 
is considered appropriate for the household type under consideration, and apply the relevant tax and 
benefit rules to find out its replacement rate levels. Research investigating effective tax rates e.g. 
OECD (1994, 1998, 1999), use this method to evaluate the replacement rates. This type of analysis 
allows the part of the tax-benefit rules under investigation to be isolated, and offers straightforward 
and easy to interpret results. There are however, a number of problems with this approach as it 
attempts to reduce complex tax-benefit systems to a single (or few) point estimates (Immervoll and 
O’Donoghue, 2002). Therefore, this analysis is likely to miss many of the important features of the 
tax-benefit system, which although not applicable to the average household, may affect a large part of 
the population.  
Another approach taken to study replacement rates is to use a representative household panel. This 
method typically looks at time-series information for individuals and records the changes. In this way, 
the problems of assumed homogeneity within stylised households can be avoided. One common 
criticism of this method is its potential selection bias, as it only looks at people whose status changes 
during the year and excludes those for whom it does not. For example, if the low replacement rate 
after retirement makes it less likely for someone currently employed to retire, then only measuring for 
people who decide to retire will result in higher replacement rate estimates than if all people currently 
working were taken into account. One possible solution is to also compute replacement rates for 
people whose status does not change by simulating the income they would receive in an alternative 
labour market situation (Immervoll and O’Donoghue, 2003b).  
An alternative way to study the replacement rate is to use a simulated dataset. Essentially, this would 
need to simulate all the possible statuses within the labour market (working, unemployed, retired etc.) 
in the panel dataset, and would use the simulated replacement rates for the analysis. Due to the 
complexity of the possible retirement choices and modelling, there have only been a few papers 
published where this method has been used in retirement studies, although the method has been well 
used in tax rate analyses in Europe (e.g. Immervoll and O’Donoghue, 2003b; Berger et al., 2003). 
This method overcomes some of the shortcomings of synthetic analysis by taking the actual 
population structure into account. However, as a natural consequence of simulation, the accuracy of 
the results is highly dependent on the quality of the model and the dataset.  
This paper uses a combined analysis from both the synthetic household and panel data approaches and 
there are a number of reasons for this choice. First, individuals are very different, and a benchmark is 
needed; second, the interest here is in the replacement rates in the real world; and third, a simulation 
approach would potentially offer more information on why people are retiring. However, this type of 
analysis is restricted to only those individuals whose history can be reconstructed. Although a 
historical dataset is available for LII (Li & O’Donghue, 2010), it only contains the individuals 
presented in the first wave, as certain variables were only collected in this segment. Therefore, there is 
a trade-off between more detailed simulated information and fewer actual observations, and less 
detailed simulated information and an increased number of actual observations. Since the value from 
actual transitions has a higher accuracy than the simulated one, the decision was made to use as many actual values as possible within this paper in order to reflect the actual replacement rate distribution of 
retirees in Ireland. 
Constructing Replacement Rates  
There are a number of approaches for estimating the replacement rate of the elderly, Immervoll and 
O’Donoghue (2003b) presented some of the analytical choices faced in calculating replacement rates 
(see also Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991). The two basic dimensions that are relevant in this 
context are: (1) which income components to include in the numerator and the denominator of the 
replacement rate and for whom; and (2) which direction of labour market transition to compute the 
replacement rate for.  
There are different measures in the existing literature which may lead to confusion and different 
estimations regarding the replacement rates (e.g. Steuerle, Spiro, and Carasso, 2000). In order to be 
consistent with the original intentions of this study, the total net disposable income prior to retirement 
was selected as the dominator. This is because it is available for many datasets and is commonly used, 
thereby allowing the results of this study to be compared to others. Also, some pensions, especially 
occupational pensions, are largely correlated to an individual’s income immediately prior to 
retirement. This makes the replacement rate useful for predicting retirement behaviours and analysis 
of the incentives for individuals to retire. Therefore, the replacement rate in this paper is defined as 
the net disposable income following retirement divided by the net income immediately prior to 
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In general, the higher the replacement rate, the more protected an individual is from the impact of 
losing their work income. High replacement rates however, may reduce individuals’ effort to stay 
within employment and provide incentives to retire early. The labour market opportunities that are 
faced by unemployed may be such that accepting the jobs offered to them would result in no or little 
financial gain. This may be particularly true for low-skilled individuals. Similarly, those currently 
employed on a low income may not lose much by entering unemployment or retirement. 
The replacement rate offers a direct way of analysing monetary incentives and income smoothing. 
However, it is also worth noting that the change of welfare being can only be indirectly inferred from 
the replacement rate. Due to the different consumption patterns, a replacement rate lower than 100% 
of pre-retirement income may still be sufficient to maintain a living standard as the cost of living can 
decline in the transition from work to retirement. For instance, a retiree will have less work-related 
expenses such as clothing and transportation, but may have an increased health-related expenditure. 
Income Decomposition 
In order to analyse what drives the replacement rate, the sources of income before and after retirement 
also need to be studied. In most countries, an individual typically has more than one source of income; 
however, the fluctuation of these income sources may depend on the status of retirement. For instance, if after becoming fully retired, there is a sharp decline of labour income, whilst at the same time, the 
dividend from a fund that was previously accumulated may start to be received together with money 
from private and public pensions. Therefore, the driving force of replacement rate cannot be fully 
understood unless all the possible income sources are explored. In this paper, the income sources are 
grouped into five categories: labour and capital income, state pension, occupational and private 
pension, social benefit, and tax (negative income). 
While the transition from one labour market state to another is a process at the individual level, the 
subsequent change in income potentially affects the well-being of other household members. 
Concurrently, the incomes of others within the household will influence the welfare measure of the 
individual or may even be sufficiently strong to change an individual’s behaviour. In addition, the 
employment status and incomes of individual household members can have important consequences 
for the amounts of taxes paid or benefits received by other household members (e.g. due to a joint 
income tax system or the assessment of total household income for computing means tested benefits). 
As a result, replacement rates at both the individual and household level are computed in this paper. 
IV.  METHODOLOGY II: THE USE OF TAX-BENEFIT MICROSIMULATION MODEL 
The paper uses a sub-component of the LIAM model to facilitate the calculation of tax benefits for 
synthetic individual cases. The tax benefit model is derived from LIAM, a dynamic microsimulation 
model designed to evaluate potential reforms of the Irish pensions system and other policies in terms 
of changes to life-cycle incomes, with a particular focus on old age income replacement rates, poverty 
and inequality measures (O’Donoghue et al., 2009).  
Simulations are run on the LII and synthetic dataset based on the systems of tax and benefit rules for 
the corresponding year. The synthetic based simulation uses the year 2000 data for the baseline 
analysis and the variables simulated and relevant for this exercise are income taxes, various family 
benefits (e.g. child benefit, lone parent benefit), pensions (e.g. state contributory pension, state non-
contributory pension, survivors’ pension etc.), and other benefits (e.g. unemployment benefits, 
disability benefit etc.). In simulating post-retirement income and computing the relevant replacement 
rates, a number of noteworthy assumptions are made: 
•  Any provisions made for special retirement compensation in collective agreements are disregarded 
•  Partial retirement is disregarded and individuals are treated as part-time workers 
•  In the case of transitions from work to retirement, it is assumed that the individuals are no longer 
employed or claiming pension at the start of the current tax year 
•  In computing incomes, in-kind benefits such as the provision of social/subsidised housing or child-
care are not included. Also not taken into account are work-related expenses (union fees, costs of 
commuting to work, costs of providing care for dependants during working hours, etc.), any 
discounts or rebates that may be available to benefit recipients (e.g. for utilities and phone bills, 
public transport, medical expenses, or school-related expenses such as books or uniforms). 
V.  DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
This paper uses the 1994-2001 Living in Ireland Survey (ECHP-LII) dataset for a simple exercise of 
labour participation simulation. The LII survey constitutes the Irish component of the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP). It is a representative household panel survey conducted on the 
Irish population annually for eight waves until 2001. The data contains information on demographic, employment, and other social economic characteristics of around 3500 households in each wave. 
Since the pension eligibilities and entitlements are often linked with career trajectories which are not 
readily available in the LII dataset, a back-simulation module was developed in order to recreate the 
working histories by exploitation of the existing variables. This module extracts the retrospective 
information from the LII dataset and applies a dynamic microsimulation in a reversed direction to 
simulate population histories. With some calibrations and alignments at both the cross-sectional and 
longitudinal levels, a simulated historical dataset that matched over 95% of the individual pension 
entitlements was recreated together with a labour market history that matched the macro statistics to a 
fairly high degree (Li and O’Donoghue, 2010). During this exercise, a partial working history was 
used to recalculate the pension eligibility for the simulation of early retirement.  
Overview of Retirements in LII 
This paper looks at retirement from the perspective of individual choices. Retirement is defined in this 
paper as exiting the labour market after the age of 55. This definition is different from the official 
retirement status, but it is more closely linked to an individual’s engagement in the labour market. 
Individuals between 55 and 75 years old who made the transition to retirement during the 8 waves of 
the panel were selected for the analysis. Since being a pensioner does not automatically mean quitting 
the Irish labour market, the reported retirement status cannot be used directly. In practice the 
following groups were included: individuals who had stopped working and were claiming pensions, 
individuals who had stopped working and who had not returned to the labour market for at least 3 of 
the waves (thus excluding temporary unreported unemployment), and individuals who had stopped 
claiming unemployment benefits without returning to work. Figure 1 compares the difference between 
reported retirement and observed retirement. As seen, the observed retirement results in a more 
flattened curve than the reported retirement due to the inclusion of unreported early retirement. The 
observed retirement pattern has a lower density around the age of 65/66, while the general trend looks 
similar to the pattern observed for reported retirement.  
Among nearly 24,000 individuals included in the LII dataset, there were around 4000 individuals in 
the age group 55-75, and in total, 257 transitions to retirement were observed. Table 3 describes the 
details of the observation filtering in this analysis. 
Table 3 Observation Filtering in LII 
Condition Case 
Total Number of Observations  100,639 
Total Number of Individuals  23,955 
Exclude Zero Weight  22286 
Age 55-75 in the dataset  3970 
Number of Retirement Observed within the Panel 257 
 Transition  from  work  218 
 Transition  from  unemployment  39 
































N.B. The observed retirement is calculated using the criteria listed in 
this paper, while reported retirement uses the variable from the original 
dataset 
 
Figure 2 gives an intuitive presentation of how the observed retirements are distributed within the LII 
dataset. Since this is a panel dataset with attritions over time, a gradual drop of the qualifying 
individuals over waves was expected. In addition, those reporting retirements in the first wave were 
excluded as the transition for these individuals could not be observed. In general, what was observed 
was as expected except for the last two waves and the particular pattern observed is due to two 
reasons. First, in order to distinguish unreported unemployment from retirement, an individual was 
required to remain outside of the labour market for at least three waves. Since the panel ends in 2001, 
it is impossible to test unemployment in 2000 and 2001using the same method, and therefore results 
in a reduction of observed retirement. Second, to account for the data attrition, the LII dataset 
introduces some new individuals in wave of year 2000. The additional individuals enlarge the base of 
our analysis and increases the number of retirement transitions observed in 2001. 
Income Level of Elderly Workers in Ireland 
Among those aged 55 to 75, the median income level of the elderly working population was €9,272 in 
1994 and €12,680 in 2001. The average income of the elderly followed a similar pattern over this 
period except for a small dip in 1996. On average, public sector workers received an annual income of 
around €30,656, while private sector workers earned on average €10,200. Those classed as self-
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Table 4 Average Earnings between the ages of 55 and 75 in Ireland for 1994-2001 
Group  Earnings  Usual hours of work 
Public sector employee  19,617.0  35.3 
Private Sector employee  14,101.2  45.4 
Self-employed 15,780.7  40.0 
Average 15,187.3  42.1 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the age-earning patterns of elderly workers in Ireland. As a general trend, the 
average income declines gradually as age increases. This result is typically what is found when 
ignoring cohort effects in estimating age-earnings profiles (Thornton, 1997; Polachek and Sidbert, 
1993). However, since the older people in the dataset represent a different cohort to the younger 
people, a large amount of the wage differences can be explained by the cohorts’ effect and their gap in 
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Figure 4 illustrates the composition of the individual income for working and retired individuals in the 
age group 55-75. As can be seen, the labour and capital income dramatically declines after retirement, 
while the size of pension income increases correspondingly. Welfare benefits, including child benefit 
and various other benefits, play a larger role after retirement, although the absolute size of the benefits 
received alters little on average. 
VI.  RESULTS I – SYNTHETIC REPLACEMENT RATE OF IRISH TAX-BENEFIT SYSTEM 
Tax benefit systems are typically complex and highly dependent on the household composition and 
employment histories. Consequently, the incentive structure of the retirement income support system 
might not be precisely measured due to the complex interactions of various social policies. Therefore, 
in order to better understand the Irish system, the analysis was commenced using a set of simple 
synthetic households with relatively simple employment trajectories. Through a synthetic simulation, 
it is possible to isolate the complex interactions of employment history, family composition, dynamics 
of earnings etc., and therefore observe the “pure” effect of the tax benefit system. The synthetic 
household starts with the following simple household structure:  
•  The household consists of only a single male member who has an average income level for the 55-
75 age band  
•  The synthetic individual is assumed to have worked in the same sector and contributed to the 
occupational pension for 10 years  
•  The worker has worked long enough and meets the eligibility criteria to receive the state 
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In the analysis, 20 possible ages (56-75) for exiting the labour market were simulated, combined with 
four possible retirement paths; namely exiting from the public sector, private sector, self-employment 
or unemployment. For this synthetic calculation, only the individual replacement rate was calculated, 
as the inclusion of extra household members may eradicate the pattern due to the assumptions of 
employment trajectories of other members which would increase the complexity of the interpretations. 
For the calculation of the replacement rate with synthetic individuals, this paper uses the last year’s 
disposable income, instead of the simulated counterfactual one as the denominator. There are for two 
reasons for this:  
First, one of the main goals of replacement rate analysis is to evaluate how well the welfare standard 
is maintained after retirement. By using the counterfactual income as the denominator, the rate 
excludes the impact of changing the labour earning level as people age. This may not be a major issue 
for synthetic analysis if a constant income stream is assumed. The earning level in real life however, 
may not be stable. As a result, the replacement rate based on the counterfactual income under-
represents the change of earnings, and consequently the consumption level and welfare being also.  
Second, in order to compare the replacement rate between a synthetic and a real life dataset, it is 
important to have a consistent definition of the replacement rate. Since counterfactual earnings do not 
exist within the real dataset, a variable which can be derived from both the synthetic and real-life 
datasets needs to be identified. The variable earning prior to retirement serves this purpose well, since 
it is available in both datasets and also correlates to the counterfactual earnings. 
Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of the replacement rate if an individual qualifies for the old age 
contributory pension. Although the actual contribution periods needed to qualify for the contributory 
state pension may vary depending on an individual’s occupation (PRSI classification) and the year of 
retirement, it was assumed that this synthetic individual has contributed to the system for at least 10 
years before the age of 65 and therefore is eligible for the contributory pension under existing Irish 
regulations.  
The graph reveals the replacement rate if individuals decide to retire at a given age. An obvious surge 
of replacement rate is observed for all scenarios at age 65/66, the official retirement age for receiving the state pension. This pattern is also reflected in the income decomposition graphs presented in 
Appendix B. Since the pension entitlement is independent of the working status after the age of 66, 
earnings in all scenarios are increased, despite retirement from the labour market. The higher level of 
income prior to retirement increases the size of the denominator in the replacement rate calculation 
and as a result, the replacement rate starts to fall after age 66. 
For the self-employed, the replacement rate dramatically increases at age 65 for retirees and reaches 
around 100% when assuming that an individual had a previous income of €7795. For private sector 
workers, the replacement rate is lower due to the higher average income level. An average single 
private sector retiree may have the highest replacement rate (53%) at age 66 if no additional 
occupational pension is received. Public sector workers have a similar pattern although the 
replacement rate is lowered to 33% due to their high income level. For the unemployed, the spike is 
most obvious as the contributory old age pension is much higher than the unemployment benefit and 
can increase to 640% of the unemployment benefit level. Since an individual cannot claim transitory 
pension if unemployed, the spike of replacement rate starts at age 66 instead of 65. 
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Synthetic replacement rate for unemployed
Assuming the individual is eligible for the state old age contributory pension. All reported rates are net replacement rates.
 
In the above analysis, it was assumed that income is stable between the ages of 55 and 75, and 
although this might be the case for some employees, it is not necessarily true for all. By combining 
the average wage level in the age group into the replacement rate analysis, a more realistic distribution 
of replacement rate can be obtained. Figure 6 illustrates how this earning profile affects the synthetic 
replacement rate. As shown, although some extra volatility has been introduced into the replacement 
rate, the general trend remains the same. The replacement rate for public sector workers after age 70 is 
not reported as they are required to retire at age 65 except a limited number of exceptions.  Despite the change in income level, the surge of replacement rate at age 65/66 can be easily spotted, 
which indicates that the pension entitlement can potentially provide a strong incentive for retiring at at 
this age
2. However, for private and public sector employees, there is an earnings rebound immediately 
after retirement age 65/66. It is likely that these retirement decisions could be endogenous, which 
means that people with a lower income retire as soon as the legal retirement age is reached, while 
higher income earners postpone their retirement, thus increasing the average wage for the post-
retirement age.  
The synthetic analysis provides valuable information regarding the existing financial patterns in the 
tax-benefit system and illustrates the impacts when retiring at different ages. Since retirement income 
is often highly correlated to the previous employment trajectory, which varies greatly across the 
population, the synthetic analysis is likely to miss many of the important features of the tax-benefit 
system, which although not applicable to the synthetic household, may affect a large part of the 
population.  
In the synthetic analysis, a single household individual was used in order to prevent the influence of 
the choices of other household members. However, over 90% of people aged over 55 live in a 
household with at least two members. Although extra individuals can be included within the synthetic 
household, it would remain a “non-typical” or “non-representative” household, no matter what 
assumptions used. The additional household member may have a very different employment 
trajectory or benefit entitlement which could dramatically change the replacement rate. In order to 
mitigate this problem, Immervoll et al. (2000) computed a wide range of stylised households with 
different income levels to investigate the dynamics of tax-benefit systems. However, in the case of 
replacement rates, it is not only the design of the tax-benefit system per se that is of interest but also 
how it applies to existing populations. As a result, further analysis was conducted using a 
representative household survey dataset (LII).  
                                                            
2 The effective retirement age in Ireland has been declining since the 1970s. However, mostly thanks to a rise in 
older female employment participation rates in the late 1980s, as well as a high level of self-employment, 
retirement ages among the elderly are still high by EU standards: in 2000 it was 63.4 for males and 60.1 for 
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Synthetic replacement rate for unemployed
Assuming the individual is eligible for the state old age contributory pension. All reported rates are net replacement rates.
 
VII.  RESULTS II – THE DISTRIBUTION OF REPLACEMENT RATES 
Distribution of Net Replacement Rates for Retired 
While the synthetic replacement rate provides in-depth analysis on the potential replacement rate for 
one particular scenario, notably a single person with an average income, this pattern may look very 
different if all the possible scenarios are pooled together from a real life dataset. Figure 7 presents the 
average net replacement rate for each of the four types of transition while an overview of the 
replacement rate by age and sector is reported in Appendix C and D. It seems that the actual 
replacement rate, to some extent, resembles part of the replacement rate pattern for an individual with 
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Graphs by Retirement Path
 
Distributions of Simulated Replacement Rate 
By only looking at people whose status changes during the year and excluding those for whom it does 
not, a potential sample selection problem arises. If replacement rates have an influence on people’s 
behaviour and people whose status remains unchanged face different replacement rates than those 
who experience transitions into or out of employment, then excluding one of these groups will result 
in a systematic bias. In order to determine whether replacement rates have an impact on retirement 
decisions it is necessary to measure them for both groups. Figure 8 reports the potential replacement 
rates for all individuals who are not retired. An obvious peak of replacement is observed in all four 
retirement paths around the age of 65/66, corresponding to the popular choice for retirement in Ireland.  
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Graphs by Retirement Path
 The Socio-Economic Characteristics of Retired Individuals with Different Replacement Rates 
As the data suggests, individual and household replacement rates have a very wide range in Ireland. 
This implied that they might also have very different career trajectories and patterns in social 
economic behaviours. A wide variety of summary statistics were used to determine how socio-
economic characteristics are related to the replacement rate level. Table 5 briefly describes the 15 
measures which were found to be relevant in describing the socio-economic characteristics of 
individuals with different replacement rates. 
When looking at three groups of individuals with differing replacement rates (lower than 40%, 40-
80%, and more than 80%), these groups exhibited very different patterns in behaviour. When 
comparing the low net replacement rate group with the other groups, then this group, on average, had 
an individual replacement rate of merely 11.1%. However, the household replacement rate was 
dramatically higher for this group and amounted to 91.1%. In addition, this group has the youngest 
retirement age amongst the three groups, which may indicate that this particular group retires early 
due to the stable income stream of other household members. This also explains why individuals with 
zero replacement rates still retire before being able to claim the state old age pension. 
The mid net replacement rate group seemed to be dominated by people retiring from work. Over 94% 
of these people were either employees or self-employed before they started to claim their pension. In 
addition, this group has the highest education attainment amongst the three groups. 
The high net replacement rate group on average has a replacement rate of over 123%, which suggests 
that their post-retirement earnings are higher than their pre-retirement income. This group exhibited 
some distinct patterns, it had the lowest educational attainment compared with the other groups and 
also much lower pre-retirement earnings compared with any other group. These two observations tally, 
as workers with a lower education attainment tend to have lower wages, which decreases the size of 
denominator. Additionally 20% of the individuals in this group retired from unemployment compared 
with less than 6% in the mid replacement rate group. Finally, welfare benefits played a larger role 
percentage wise in the post-retirement income of this group compared with other groups. 






Rate  Group 
Low 
Replacemen
t Rate (-0.4) 
(0.4-0.8) (0.8+) 
Total 
Percentage with higher education  14.89%  25.71%  8.62%  17.90% 
Individual net replacement rate  11.10%  55.90%  123.20%  54.70% 
Household net replacement rate   91.10%  75.80%  108.20%  88.70% 
Male 54.26%  74.29%  89.66%  70.43% 
Have a spouse  79.79%  87.62%  79.31%  82.88% 
Chronic Illness  2.13%  3.81%  17.24%  6.23% 
Still have a mortgage to pay  14.63%  14.56%  11.11%  13.81% 
Household size  3.1  3.0  3.1  3.1 
Retire from work (%)  77.66%  94.29%  79.31%  84.82% 
Usual working hours per week before 
retirement (if working) 
34.21 35.26 30.20  33.84 
Was in public sector (if working)  20.55%  37.37%  8.70%  25.69% Average retirement age  62.8  64.1  64.8  63.8 
Individual Disposable Income after 
retirement 
2501 9310.2  9054.4  6761.9 
Household Disposable Income after 
retirement 
19788.8 20494.0 19396.7  19988.4 
Individual disposable income before 
retirement 
14410.9 17062.9  8191.6 14090.8 
Proportion of people in this group  36.58%  40.86%  22.57%  100.00% 
 
Figure 9 further analyses the income decompositions amongst high and low replacement rate groups. 
By comparison, the high replacement rate group derived a larger share of their post retirement income 
from state pension and other welfare benefits, than the other two groups. Occupational and private 
pensions were the main source of income for the group with the mid replacement rate, which for the 
years 1994-2001, accounted for 79.0% of their post retirement income, compared with 42.9% for the 
high replacement rate group and 54% for the low replacement rate group. 
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 Time dependency of the replacement rate and earning decomposition 
In addition to the level of replacement rate measured immediately after retirement, it is also 
interesting to look at how the level of income and replacement rate fluctuates following a few years of 
retirement. If the net disposable income prior retirement is kept as the common denominator for 
replacements rate in all years, then the replacement rate changes over time. The addition of a time 
dimension would therefore allow both the short and long term monetary incentives of retirement to be 
understood.  
Figure 10 presents a graph which adds the time dimension into the replacement rate analysis. The 
figure shows that for people retiring before the age of 60, the replacement rate remained relatively 
stable for the 6 years after retirement. This suggests that there is not much change in the total income 
level as all the rates were calculated using earnings before retirement as the common denominator. 
For the population who retired after the age of 60, the replacement rate exhibited a slow upwards 
trend. This increase is mostly driven by the state pension for people who retire before the age of 65, as 
they have had to wait for a few years before they can claim this pension. Among the population who 
retired later, capital income accounts for most of the increase observed. The increase in capital income 
might come from the maturation of previous investments and certain private pension arrangements.  
If the observations are grouped by their level of replacement rate instead of retirement age, as in 
Figure 11, then it seems that the total income level, as well as the replacement rates, is more or less 
stable except for the low replacement rate group, who appears to have more fluctuated income due to 
their lower income level, and the later years of the high replacement rate group (see also Appendix E). 
This indicates that retirees in the low replacement rate group typically do not have as stable an income 
source as the retirees in the other groups. This pattern may also explain why these people belong to 
the low replacement rate group to start with. Among the mid and high replacement rate groups, capital 
income, on average slowly increased after retirement, a finding which is consistent with the results 
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VIII.  THE RETIREMENT PATTERN AND REPLACEMENT RATES 
Observed Retirement Pattern and the Observed Replacement Rates 
This section compares the replacement rate patterns and the retirement patterns, to examine whether 
monetary incentives play a role in the retirement decision. The Irish regulations, as reviewed earlier, 
suggest that the system provides a strong incentive to retire at age 65/66. At the same time, the 
estimations from the synthetic and LII datasets confirm the rise of replacement rate at around age 65 
and 66, two crucial ages in the Irish tax system in terms of pension eligibility. It would therefore be 
interesting to investigate whether the retirement pattern matches the replacement rate pattern. 
Figure 12 overlaps the age-retirement pattern with the individual replacement rate profile. The age-
replacement rate curve measures the fluctuations of earnings level as well as the monetary incentive 
of retirement introduced by the social welfare system. As can be seen, although the two patterns do 
not resemble each other completely and the scales are different, nevertheless the retirement pattern 
does respond to change in the replacement rates.  
Figure 13 uses the household based replacement rates instead of the individual replacement rates. 
Since a household usually consists of several people who may not all retire at the same time, this 
replacement rate is less volatile when compared with the individual based replacement rate. Because the curve is smoother, the matching is less obvious graphically, although the replacement rates still 
correspond to the change in the number of retirees.  
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Smoothed replacement rate at individual level
 
Previous figures suggest that the relationship between the net replacement rates and retirement 
crudely correspond in terms of the peak period at the age of 65/66. However, the benefits and 
entitlements of the Irish tax benefit system are usually highly related to the job sector and previous 
contributions. As a result, the retirement and replacement rate patterns were investigated further by 
grouping individuals according to their employment status prior to retirement, as shown in Figure 14 
and Figure 15.  
It seems that the replacement rate matches well with the retirement pattern for people who retired 
from work as indicated in Figure 14. Figure 15 looks at the nature of the retiree’s last job, shows that 
the correlation between replacement rate and the number of retired seems to be strongest for those 
who retire from the private sector. The vast majority of public sector workers retire at age 65 despite a 
relatively flat replacement rate curve, although this is mainly due to the mandatory retirement age 
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Graphs by Retirement Path
 
Social-Economic Characteristics of the Early and Late Retirement Groups 
As presented in the previous tables and graphs, the age of 65/66 is the most popular choice for 
retirement in Ireland. Nonetheless, there are still many individuals who retire much earlier or later 
than at the average age. Table 6 highlights some of the main social economic characteristics found for 
the four different retirement age groups.  











Percentage with higher 
education  16.42% 18.27% 22.03% 11.11% 17.90% 
Individual net 
replacement rate  43.84% 50.95% 69.60% 63.26% 54.67% 
Household net 
replacement rate   105.11%  79.66% 84.15% 92.49% 88.67% 
Male  58.21% 75.00% 69.49% 85.19% 70.43% 
Have a spouse  80.60%  84.62%  79.66%  88.89%  82.88% 
Chronic  Illness  5.97% 6.73% 5.08% 7.41% 6.23% 
Still have a mortgage to 
pay  22.81%  17.35% 5.17%  0.00% 13.81% 
Household  size  3.42 3.06 2.88 2.52 3.05 
Retirement from work 
(%)  73.13% 80.77% 98.31%  100.00%  84.82% 
Usual working hours 
per week before 
retirement (if working)  31.18 36.98 33.25 30.15 33.84 
Was in public sector (if 
working)  30.61%  39.29%  13.79% 0.00% 25.69% 
Average  retirement  age  58.12 63.13 67.15 73.00 63.79 Individual Disposable 
Income  after  retirement  5902.98 6807.06 7624.12 6835.57 6761.93 
Household Disposable 
Income after retirement  24342.53 19291.70 17333.24 17669.57 19988.43 
Individual disposable 
income before 
retirement  13376.59 14507.87 13666.70 15183.44 14090.81 
Proportion of people in 
this  group  26.07% 40.47% 22.96% 10.51%  100.00% 
 
There are several noteworthy trends from Table 6. First, it seems that the age of retirement is 
negatively correlated with the individual replacement rate but not the household replacement rate. In 
fact, the group that retires earliest also has the highest household replacement rate, indicating that 
some early retirements may be induced by the monetary incentives provided by other household 
members. In addition, a higher replacement rate also implies a relatively lower cost of retirement.  
Second, the average household size is declining as retirement age increases, for which there may be 
two reasons. The higher mortality rate at the later age may result in a smaller household size or, 
alternatively, a smaller household might be the reason behind later retirement as there are less people 
to pool resources.  
Third, people who retired before the age of 65 were found to have a higher chronic illness rate when 
compared to the group who retired at age 66-70. This might indicate that the chronic illness may drive 
people to retire earlier; however, the chronic illness rate is highest for people who retire after the age 
of 71. This pattern may suggest that the incentive structure in the current legislation may push more 
physically healthy people out of the labour market at age 66-70 than for the other age brackets.  
Fourth, retiring from unemployment tends to occur at an earlier stage. As shown in Table 6, the 
percentage of people who retired from work increased steadily as the retirement age rose. In the LII 
dataset, more than 98% of people who retired after the age of 66 made the transition from work, 
compared with only 73% if they retired before the age of 60. This suggests that the early retirees 
might have had to retire early because they could not find another job. It is also worth noting that the 
percentage of elderly retiring from unemployment might be under-reported for late retirees. Since the 
unemployment benefit is same as the state pension benefits, there is no additional benefit by applying 
for unemployment benefit for elderly people if they are eligible for both benefits. This might lead to 
some underreporting of the retirement transition from unemployment.  
To further analyse the differences between early and late retirees, the income sources in the year prior 
to retirement and in the year of retirement were decomposed (Figure 16). This showed that early 
retirees relied much more heavily on welfare benefits compared to those retired later. 
Figure 16 shows that not only does the level of income differ between early and late retirees as 
illustrated in Table 6, but that their income sources are also largely different. Between 1994 and 2001 
when the LII survey was conducted, occupational and private pensions were the largest source of 
income for those retired at age 55 or earlier. This accounted for 82.4 per cent of their disposable 
income on average, compared with 17.6 per cent for retirees who retired after age 70. In addition, it 
seems that early retirees rely more heavily on welfare benefits (33.9%), which is much higher than the 
late retirees (2.9%). In general, early retirees rely mostly on welfare benefits and occupational pension, 
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IX.  CONCLUSION 
This paper analyses the retirement pattern and the replacement rate observed in Ireland using the LII 
panel dataset. Due to the fact that the Irish regulations allow working while receiving the state pension, 
this paper used the observed retirement instead of the reported retirement status to address the 
potential differences between pension eligibility and retiring from the labour market. 
The paper found that the average replacement rate for newly retired workers using the LII dataset was 
approximately 54.7% but this figure has a high standard deviation value and this suggests that there is 
a large inequality of replacement rates among retirees. Workers from different sectors had very 
different earning profiles and replacement rates according to the synthetic calculation performed. A 
typical self-employed worker would be able to maintain an income that is more than 50% of his/her 
pre-retirement earnings, while workers from other sectors had a dramatically lower replacement rate, 
mostly due to their higher pre-retirement earnings. 
The observed replacement rates and earning profiles present in the dataset had a high degree of 
fluctuation due to the complexities in the household structure and employment trajectories. In addition, 
the relatively low number of observations resulted in graphs less smooth than expected. Individuals 
with high and low replacement rates were found to have very different social economic characteristics. 
The high replacement rate group tended to be less educated, had a lower income and a higher 
dependency on social benefits. Individuals in the low replacement rate group, however, had a high 
household replacement rate of 91% on average. The state pension was a major source of income for 
all categories except for those retiring earlier than 65, who relied heavily on occupational and private 
pensions. 
In addition, the paper found that the number of people going through retirement roughly corresponded 
to the individual worker replacement rate, especially for those who retired from the private sector or 
who were self-employed. The replacement rate is not stable as people remain retired for longer and, 
on average, there was a slight increase due to welfare benefits and capital income. It seems that the 
growth rate of the replacement rate is positively correlated to the age of retirement. Although replacement rate is one of the most intuitive measurements that can be obtained from the 
dataset, it is still simplistic and potentially inaccurate for measuring welfare being as it does not 
account for employment status related expenditures and savings, e.g. transportation costs, medical 
costs. However, it does give an overview of the general trend and an analysis of the incentive 
structure among retirees in Ireland. This paper could potentially benefit from further research using a 
larger dataset where greater heterogeneities can be further explored.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A Private and Occupational Pension Coverage (Percentage) in 2002  
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Females          
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No Retirement (self-employed) Retired (no additional pension)
Labour and capital income
State pensions















5 5      6 0      6 5      7 0      7 5 55      60      65      70      75
No Retirement (Unemployment) Retired
Labour and capital income
State pensions












Appendix C Replacement Rate by Age 
Age  Individual Replacement Rate Household Replacement Rate 
56 67.8%  100.5% 
57 54.0%  90.3% 
58 21.8%  122.2% 
59 39.4%  120.3% 
60 46.6%  82.1% 
61 53.9%  80.8% 
62 63.6%  76.7% 
63 39.7%  86.3% 
64 31.7%  99.4% 
65 58.3%  66.0% 
66 77.6%  88.1% 
67 63.3%  73.1% 
68 62.0%  83.5% 
69 58.8%  72.9% 
70 75.6%  125.2% 
71 34.2%  81.2% 
72 70.9%  102.4% 
73 72.4%  83.5% 
74 75.1%  92.3% 
75 55.9%  114.9% 
 
Appendix D Individual and Household Replacement Rate by Sector and Age Group  
Age Group  Retirement Path 





  Retirement Age group (56-60) 
1.59% 47.53% 
49.84
%  42.06% 
  Retirement Age group (61-65) 
41.06% 56.86% 
46.63
%  46.97% 
  Retirement Age group (66-70) 
71.01% 73.61% 
55.21
%  0.00% 
  Retirement Age group (71-75)  17.20% 66.95%   
Household Replacement Rate        
  Retirement Age group (56-60) 
53.61% 111.30% 
66.80
%  138.17% 
  Retirement Age group (61-65) 
87.16% 90.27% 
58.46
%  88.33% 
  Retirement Age group (66-70) 
67.84% 91.70% 
59.52
%  46.48% 
  Retirement Age group (71-75)  74.55% 93.93%    
Appendix E Replacement Rate by Years of Retirement 
Years in Retirement  Individual Replacement Rate Household Replacement Rate
-1 (Year before Retirement)  100.0%  100.0% 
0 (Retirement Year)  57.9%  89.1% 
1 72.3%  98.7% 
2 92.1%  109.1% 
3 92.2%  104.3% 
4 87.3%  125.6% 
5 105.8%  130.8% 
6 60.8%  157.7% 
 
 
 